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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
Virginia Joanie Goodman, a person
under eighteen years of age.

Case No.
13822

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

S T A T E M E N T OF T H E N A T U R E
O F T H E CASE
The appellant, Virginia Joanie Goodman, appeals
from a decision against her in the Fifth Judicial District
Juvenile Court, convicting her of interfering with an
officer and the illegal use of an alcoholic beverage.
DISPOSITION IN T H E L O W E R COURT
The appellant was convicted of interfering with an
officer and the illegal use of an alcoholic beverage before the Honorable Paul C. Keller, in the Fifth Judicial District Juvenile Court, on April 25, 1974. Appellant was ordered to attend the alcohol education course
of the Utah Division of Family Services at Blanding,
Utah.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent respectfully submits the decisions
and rulings of the Court below should be sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 29, 1973, Officer Kenneth Vee Palmer, a San Juan County, Utah, deputy sheriff, was
driving his patrol car north from Bluff, Utah, when
he observed a vehicle driven by a person whom he knew
did not have a driver's license (T. 4-5). Officer Palmer
stopped the vehicle, and requested that the driver, Linda
Lehi, get into his patrol car so that he could issue her
a citation for driving without a valid driver's license
(T. 5). When the officer and Ms. Lehi were in the car,
Officer Palmer began issuing a citation (T. 5).
Officer Palmer testified that the appellant, who
had been in Ms. Lehi's vehicle along with several others,
came up to the officer's window, and requested that he
drive her back to Bluff (T. 5). The officer further testified that he told the appellant that he was busy and
couldn't give her a ride to Bluff, but on her continual
requests he told her he would consider it after he had
finished the citation (T. 5). Appellant responded with
threatening remarks, telling the officer that he couldn't
take possesison of the car and couldn't have it towed to
Bluff (T. 6). Officer Palmer then advised the appellant that she was interfering wtih his work and made it
clear to her that he would have to arrest her if she didn't
leave (T. 6). The officer requested that appellant leave
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the area and start walking toward Bluff (T. 6). Appellant walked across the highway to a little draw where
she stopped (T. 6-7).
After appellant left, Officer Palmer testified that
he then placed Ms. Lehi under arrest for driving under
the influence of intoxicating alcohol (T. 15-16). Appellant then returned to the patrol car and again asked
the officer to take her to Bluff (T. 16). Officer Palmer
once again ordered appellant to leave immediately or
he was going to arrest her for interfering (T. 7). I n response, appellant said to the officer, "You fuckin'
puke." (T. 8). Officer Palmer then placed the appellant under arrest for interfering with an officer and the
unlawful consumption of an alcoholic beverage by a
minor (T. 8, 18).
Officer Palmer testified that appellant's actions
were definitely that of intoxication in that she was very
loud and talkative, she had an unsteady walk, and the
smell of alcohol was on her breath (T. 8, 9, 11). Officer
Palmer also testified that he didn't arrest the appellant
immediately for intoxication because he felt the issuing
of the citation to Ms. Lehi was more important and he
requested appellant to leave the area to prevent having
to arrest her and thereby giving her a break (T. 11).
However, Officer Palmer felt compelled to arrest the
appellant after she uttered her profane remark because
she was interfering with his work as an officer and causing him an unusual amount of time to arrest Ms. Lehi
(T. 9, 10). Officer Palmer also testified that the appelDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lant was agitating Ernest Casey, who was also arrested,
and he felt a threat of violence from the other people
that had been in Ms. Lehi's car (T. 13, 20).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED OF INTERFERING WITH AN ARREST OR DETENTION
IS NOT OVERBROAD AND DOES NOT INFRINGE UPON APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF
FREE SPEECH.
Appellant was convicted of interfering with an arrest or detention under Section 76-8-305, Utah Code
Ann. (Supp. 1973), which provides:
"A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor when he intentionally interferes with a
person recognized to be a law enforcement official seeking to effect an arrest or detention
of himself or another regardless of whether
there is a legal basis for the arrest."
Appellant was arrested under the above section of
the criminal code because her actions and words were
interefering with the lawful work of a police officer by
causing him an unusual amount of time to effect an
arrest (T. 9, 10). Appellant contends that this section
is overbroad in that it curtails the First Amendment
right of freedom of speech. Appellant's brief at 7.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The United States Supreme Court has traditionally held that it "is not an abridgment of freedom of
speech to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language either spoken, written or printed." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S.Ct.
453, 13 L.Ed. 2d 471 (1965). The Supreme Court also
held in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 378, 88 S.Ct.
1663, 20 L.Ed. 2d 672 (1968), that when speech and
nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest
in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
The type of governmental interest necessary to
curtail the freedom of speech of those persons involved in
a contact with the police was laid down by the Supreme
Court in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct.
1953, 32 L.Ed. 2d 584 (1972). In Colten, a police officer stopped a vehicle for an expired license plate. The
defendant, who was riding in another car and a friend
of the driver of the stopped vehicle, approached the
police officer and made an effort to enter the conversation. The defendant and several others were told the
affair was none of their business and were asked repeatedly to leave the area. In response to one of these
requests, the defendant replied that he wished to make
a transportation arrangement for the driver of the
stopped vehicle. The police asked the defendant three
more times to leave the area and when he refused to do
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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so he was arrested for violating Kentucky's disorderly
conduct statute.
I n rejecting the defendant's contention that he was
engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment,
the Court stated:
"[CJolten's conduct in refusing to move
on atfer being directed to do so was not, without more, protected by the First Amendment.
Nor can we believe that Colten, although he
was not trespassing or disobeying any traffic
regulation himself, could not be required to
move on. H e had no constitutional right to observe the issuance of a traffic ticket or to engage the issuing officer in conversation at that
itme." 407 U.S. at 109
Then the Court established the governmental interest involved:
''The State has a legitimate interest in enforcing its traffic laws and its officers were entitled to enforce them free from possible
interference or interruption from bystanders,
even those claiming a third-party interest in
the transaction." 407 U.S. at 109.
In the present case a single police officer was confronted with several people on a rural road. The officer
testified that the appellant was agitating an adult male
and the officer also felt a threat of violence from the
other people that had been in the stopped vehicle (T. 13,
20). Under these circumstances the order to disperse
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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given to the appellant was suited to the occision and
satisfied an important governmental interest in protecting a police officer from possible interference or
interruption.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1953) can easily be
distinguished from the ordinance found unconstitutional
in Lewis v. New Orleans,
U.S
, 39 L.Ed. 2d
214 (1974). See appellant's brief at 9. The Court objected to the ordinance because it punished only spoken
words. The Court then proceeded to state that the ordinance would withstand an attack upon its facial constitutionality only if it is not susceptible of application to
speech, although regular or offensive, that is protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendment. 39 L.Ed, at
219.
As reasonably construed, Section 76-8-305, is not
overbroad in that it does not prohibit the lawful exercise
of any constitutional right. The plain meaning of the
statute, in requiring that the proscribed conduct be done
"intentionally" is that the specified intent must be the
predominant intent. Predominance can be determined
either (1) from the fact that no bona fide intent to exercise a constitutional right appears to have existed or
(2) from the fact that the interest to be advanced by
the particular exercise of a constitutional right is insignificant in comparison with the inconvenience, annoyance
or alarm caused by the exercise.
I n the instant case the evidence warrants the conclusion that the appellant was not undertaking to exerDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cise any constitutionally protected freedom. She was not
exercising the right of freedom of speech because that
right is concerned with expression of thought or dissemination of idea. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1959). Appellant was
not seeking to express a thought to any listener or to
disseminate any idea. She simply was trying to irritate
the police officer by her presence and by efforts at interruption. H e r speech and conduct had no purpose
other than to cause inconvenience and annoyance.
Individuals cannot be convicted under Section 76-8305 merely for expressing unpopular or annoying ideas.
The statute comes into operation only when the individual's interest in expression, judged in the light of
all relevant factors, is miniscule compared to a particular
public interest in preventing that expression or conduct
at that time and place. The statute as applied here did
not chill or stifle the exercise of any constitutional right.
Appellant's conviction is therefore proper and must
be affirmed.
POINT II
THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED FOR INTERFERING WITH AN ARREST OR DETENTION
DOES APPLY TO APPELLANT'S CONDUCT.
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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9
305 (Supp. 1973), under which she was arrested for
interfering with an arrest or detention, limits its application to force or conceivably threats of force, which in
fact constitute actual intereference, and does not apply
to other forms of speech. See Appellant's brief at 14.
In the General Provisions of the Utah Criminal
Code, Section 76-1-106 states in part:
"All provisions of this code and offenses
defined by the laws of this state shall be construed according to the fair import of their
terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law and general purposes of section 76-1-104, Utah Code Ann. (1953)."
When dealing with the interpretation of the words
in a statute, the Utah Supreme Court in Grant v. Utah
State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P . 2d 1035
(1971), stated:
"Foundational rules require that we assume that each term of a statute was used advisedly; and that each should be given an interpretation and application in accord with
their usually accepted meaning, unless the context otherwise requires." 485 P . 2d at 1036
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Edition (1934), defines interference as, "to enter into, or
take a part in, the concerns of others; to intermeddle;
interpose; intervene." The definiation given by the
American Heritage Dictionary of the English LanDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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guage (1973) of interference is, "to be a hindrance or
obstacle; impede."
To contend that the word interference as used in
Section 76-8-305 is limited to force or threats of force
would apply it to a strict construction in violation of
Section 76-1-106, Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1973), and
do an injustice to the "usually accepted meaning test"
as laid down by this Court in Grant.
The Utah Supreme Court gave an interpretation
of the meaning of "interference" in construing a former
interference statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-54 (1953)
in State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 P . 2d 1060
(1955):
"Such interference or resistance need not be
in the form of physical force or violence, but it
is sufficient that there be some direct action
amounting to affirmative interference." 286
P . 2d at 1062.
In the present case, the appellant attempted to
engage the officer in a conversation and was informed
that she was interfering and was requested to leave the
area (T. 6). Appellant left the area, but in a short time
returned and again attempted to engage the officer in
conversation (T. 16). In response to another request
to leave the area the appellant responded with profanity
(T. 8). The arresting officer testified that the appellant was interfering with his work and causing him an
unusual amount of time to effect an arrest (T. 9, 10).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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All these acts, coupled together, definitely amount to an
affirmative interference punishable by Section 76-8-305,
Utah Code Ann.
In State v. Taylor, 38 N.J.Super. 6, 118 A.2d 36
(1955), the Appellant Division of the Superior Court
of New Jersey held that interference with police in the
lawful discharge of their duties occurs if the conduct
of the person charged was calculated in any appreciable
degree to hamper or impede police in performance of
their duties as they saw them. I n State v. Harris, 4
Conn. Cir. 534, 236 A.2d 479 (1967), the Appellate
Division of the Circuit Court of Connecticut held that
when the defendant approached police while they were
arresting an intoxicated man and made the task of the
officer's more difficult by talking and arguing with the
police was guilty of interfering with police.
Therefore, Section 76-8-305, Utah Code Ann.
(Supp. 1973) was properly applied in the present case
and appellant's conviction should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
THE LOWER COURT ARE SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-100 (1953), states in
part:
"When a child is found to come within the
provisions of Section 55-10-77, the court shall
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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so adjudicate and make a finding of the facts
upon which it bases its jurisdiction over the
child."
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-77 (1953), states in part:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, the
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
in proceedings:
(1) Concerning any child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance...."
The court below heard uncontradicted testimony
from a police officer that the appellant had interf erred
with his work as an officer by causing him an unusual
amount of time to effect an arrest (T. 9, 10). The court
then specifically found that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305
(1953), covered the particular situation in which the appellant was involved and therefore the allegations of the
petition charging the appellant with interfering with
an officer were true (T. 30).
The court had also heard uncontradicted evidence
from the officer that the appellant had consumed alcoholic beverages (T. 8, 9, 11). The court again made the
specific finding that the officer was competent to render
an opinion in this area and the court was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had been
consuming an alcoholic beverage in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 32-7-15.
Since the court found that appellant had violated
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
two sections of the Utah Criminal Code it had jurisdiction over the appellant per section 55-10-77.
CONCLUSION
The statute under which appellant was arrested
for interfering with an officer is constitutionally permissible and appellant's conduct clearly falls within the
boundaries of the statute. In addition ,the lower court's
findings and conclusions are sufficient to support appellant's conviction. For these reasons, respondent respectfully submits that the conviction of Virginia Joanie
Goodman should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y
Attorney General
E A R L F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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